TAFSIRI-MAKALA YA UHURU WA MAHAKAMA NA MAJUKUMU YA MAJAJI

THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN PROMOTING
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
JUKUMU LA MAJAJI KATIKA KUKUZA UHURU WA MAHAKAMA




(A paper presented at a Conference on the
Independence of the judiciary in Sub-
Saharan Africa, organized by the
KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION,
at Entebbe, Uganda,
on 27th June, 2008 )
Makala iliyowasilishwa kwenye Mkutano wa Uhuru wa Mahakama Kusini mwa Jangwa la Sahara,ulioandaliwa na Shirika la Konrad Adenauer Foundation,Entebbe Uganda,27 juni,2008

By
Na
THE HON. MR. JUSTICE (RET’D)
BARNABAS A. SAMATTA, FORMER
CHIEF JUSTICE OF TANZANIA
Mhe. Jaji Mstaafu Barnabas A.Samatta,Jaji Mkuu wa Zamani wa Tanzania

“An assertion of independence of the judiciary is no function to be lightly indulged in by timid souls nor is it a playground for the faint – hearted.”
- The Hon. Mr. Justice Lehohla, Chief Justice of the Kingdom of Lesotho
“Kusisitiza Uhuru wa Mahakama si kazi ya kufanywa kiurahisi na watu wenye roho za hofu wala sio uwanja wa wenye mioyo tetemefu”
-Mhe.Jaji Lehohla, Jaji Mkuu wa Ufalme wa Lesotho.

“Without independence the Judge would cease to be a Judge and hence Venderbilt has said that in a representative democratic Government the power of Judiciary depends largely on its reputation for independence”.
- Rarn Keshav Ranade, an eminent Indian jurist
“Bila kuwa na Uhuru Jaji hawezi kuwa Jaji na ndio maana Venderbilt alisema, katika serikali yenye demokrasia wakilishi mamlaka ya mahakama yanategemea sana hadhi yake katika uhuru”
-Rarn Keshav Ranade, Mwanasheria Mahiri wa India.


When, in November last year, President Pervez Musharaf made an order sacking, according to the BBC, sixty judges, some sitting in the Supreme Court, and placing them under house arrests, one felt compelled to believe that the independence of the judiciary was heading for extinction in Pakistan. Fortunately, that calamity has not taken place. A new administration has decided, so to speak, to reverse the President’s decision. It has been said by an eminent jurist, correctly in my view, that “the strength and stability of a modern democratic State pivots upon the vision and wisdom of the legislature, the efficiency and incorruptibility of the executive and the integrity of the judiciary”. In this paper I propose to examine the role of judges in promoting the independence of the judiciary, of which they are guardians, the chief justice being its chief guardian.
Mwezi Novemba mwaka jana, ambapo Rais Pervez Musharraf alipotoa amri ya kuwafuta kazi majaji sita wa mahakama kuu kwa mujibu wa BBC, na kuwaweka kizuizini nyumbani mwao, mtu angelazimika kuamini kuwa uhuru wa mahakama Pakistan ulikuwa unaelekea kufutika.Bahati nzuri, janga hili halikutokea,utawala mpya uliamua kutangua uamuzi wa Rais. Imepata kusemwa na mwanasheria mahiri na kwa mtazamo wangu ni sahihi kuwa,”uthabiti na uimara wan chi ya kisasa yenye demokrasia unategemea sana dira na hekima za bunge, utendaji mzuri, serikali isiyohongeka na hadhi ya mahakama”. Katika makala haya napendekeza kuchunguza jukumu la majaji katika kukuza uhuru wa mahakama, ambao wao ni walezi wake na jaji mkuu ni mlezi wake mkuu.

Constitutions of many States guarantee that independence, but they do not define the term. Many jurists who have written about it have preferred to describe rather than define it. I propose to do the same. The independence of the judiciary may be said to consist of the following five elements:
Katiba za nchi nyingi zinaahidi kulinda uhuru wa mahakama japokuwa haziaini istilahi hiyo. Wanasheria wengi ambao wameandika kuhusu uhuru huo wamependelea zaidi kuuelezea kuliko kuuaini (kuufasili).Napendekeza pia kufanya hivyo hivyo. Uhuru, naweza kusema unahusisha makundi makuu ya tano yafuatayo:

(1) Independence from the legislature and executive (including institutions of local governments). This type of judicial independence is known as external independence.

(2) Independence from litigants, complainants, prosecutors, accused, witnesses and counsel.
(3) Independence from judicial colleagues and superiors. This is known as internal independence.
(4) Independence from society or groups thereof.
(5) Personal independence (security of tenure and reasonable conditions of service and remuneration).
1. Uhuru kutoka kwa bunge na watendaji wa serikali(ukihusisha taasisi za serikali za mitaa). Uhuru wa aina hii unaitwa uhuru wa nje.
2. Uhuru toka kwa wadaawa, walalamikaji, waendesha mashtaka, washtakiwa, mashahidi na mawakili.
3. Uhuru toka kwa wanamahakama wenzake na wakuu wake. Huu unaitwa uhuru wa ndani.
4. Uhuru toka kwa jamii na makundi yake.
5. Uhuru binafsi(usalama kazini na mazingira ya wastani ya kazi na maslahi).

It may be useful to say a word or two on the independence from judicial colleagues and superiors and the one from society or groups thereof as these two types of judicial independence are more technical in character than the other three.
Itakuwa vema kusema neon moja au mawili kuhusu uhuru wa mahakama toka kwa wanamahakama wengine na wakuu na uhuru kutoka kwa jamii na makundi yake kwa kuwa aina hizi mbili za uhuru wa mahakama ni tata zaidi kisifa kuliko aina nyingine tatu.

Judicial independence will be incomplete if a judicial officer is not free from interference by his colleagues or superiors in the discharge of his judicial functions. While his superiors are, subject to the law, entitled to give him administrative directions or guidance aimed at ensuring quick disposal of business in his court, he cannot be directed as to how he should determine the matter or dispute before him or as to what sentence, if any, he should impose on an accused person he has found guilty. These are matters entirely in his hands. If he strays into an error on any of them a higher court will, on appeal or in revision, correct him. The necessity of the judicial independence from colleagues and superiors has been alluded to by a number of eminent jurists. Justice Douglas of the Supreme Court of the United States used the following celebrated words in expressing it:
Uhuru wa mahakama hautakuwa kamili iwapo afisa wa mahakama hayuko huru kutokana na kuingiliwa na wenzake ama wakubwa zake katika utekelezaji wa majukumu yake ya kimahakama. Wakati wakubwa zake kwa mujibu wa sheria, wanayo haki ya kumpa maelekezo au miongozo ya kiutendaji inayolenga katika kuhakikisha utekelezaji wa haraka wa kazi zake mahakamani,hawezi kuelekezwa namna gani atatue mgogoro au kesi iliyopo mbele yake au ni hukumu gani , kama ikiwapo, aitoe kwa mtuhumiwa aliyekutwa na hatia. Haya ni mambo yaliyo ndani ya mikono yake mwenyewe. Akiteleza kimakosa katika lolote kati ya haya, mahakama ya juu zaidi, kwa njia ya rufaa au mapitio, itamrekebisha. Umuhimu wa uhuru wa mahakama toka kwa wanamahakama wengine na wakuu umepata kutajwa sana na wanasheria mbalimbali. Jaji Douglas wa mahakama kuu ya Marekani alitumia maneno yafuatayo kuuelezea:

“No matter how strong an individual judge’s spine, the threat of punishment - the greatest peril to judicial independence - would project as dark a shadow whether cast by political strangers or by judicial colleagues. A federal judge must be independent of every other judge …. Neither one alone nor any number banded together can act as censor and place sanctions on him. It is vital to preserve the opportunities for judicial individualism.”
“Haijalishi ni namna gani jaji alivyothabiti, tishio la adhabu- Hatari kubwa kwa uhuru wa maakama-itajitokeza mithili ya kivuli cha kiza, kiwe kimesababishwa na wanasiasa au wanamahakama wenzake. Jaji wa shirikisho lazima awe huru kwa kila jaji mwingine…..Si mtu mmoja pekee au idadi yoyote ikiwekwa pamoja anaweza kuwa kama mchunguzi na kumwekea vikwazo.Hivyo ni muhimu kulinda uhuru binafsi wa mahakama.”

The learned authors of the book, Legal and Professional Ethics (3rd ed., 2003), discuss the internal independence and conclude as follows on p. 415:

Wasomi watunzi wa kitabu cha,Sheria na maadili ya kieledi(toleo la tatu.,2003) wanajadili uhuru wa ndani wa mahakama na kuhitimisha kama ifuatavyo katika ukurasa wa 415.



“The heart of judicial independence [ is ] judicial individualism. The judiciary is not a disembodied abstraction. It is composed of individual men and women who work primarily on their own.”
“moyo wa uhuru wa mahakama ni uhuru binafsi.Mahakama si dhana tenganifu.Imeundwa na wanaume na wanawake ambao wanafanya kazi kwa misingi ya kujitegemea”

The independence from colleagues and superiors is also alluded to in the Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct. I will be permitted, I hope, to quote the relevant two passages in extenso. This is what the learned authors observe, at p. 50:
Uhuru toka kwa wanamahakama wengine na wakubwa umepata kutajwa pia katika masimulizi ya kanuni za mwenendo wa mahakama za Bangalore. Nitaruhusiwa nadhani kunukuu aya husika kwa upana wake. Hivi ndivyo wasomi hao wanavyosema, Uk.50:

“The task of judging implies a measure of autonomy which involves the judge’s conscience alone. Therefore, judicial independence requires not only the independence of the judiciary as an institution from the other branches of government; it also requires judges being independent from each other. In other words, judicial independence depends not only on freedom from undue external influence, but also freedom from undue influence which might in some situations come from the actions or attitudes of other judges. A judge may sometimes find it helpful to ‘pick the brain’ of a colleague on a hypothetical basis. However, judicial decision-making is the responsibility of the individual judge, including each judge sitting in a collegiate appellate court.”
Kazi ya kuhukumu inanasihi kipimo cha mamlaka kamili ambayo yanahusisha utashi wa jaji pekee. Kwa hiyo, uhuru wa mahakama unahitaji sio tu uhuru wa mahakama kama taasisi toka matawi mengine ya serikali, bali unahitaji majaji wawe huru kati yao. Kwa maneno mengine, uhuru wa mahakama unategemea sio tu uhuru toka taathiri toka nje bali pia uhuru toka taathiri ambazo wakati mwingine zinaweza tokana na matendo au mitazamo ya majaji wengine. Jaji wakati mwingine anawezaona yafaa kutumia “ubongo” wa mwenzie kinadhana tu. Hata hivyo, utoaji maamuzi ya mwisho ni jukumu lake mwenyewe, hii inahusu pia jaji anayekaa katika mahakama nyenza ya rufaa.

The learned authors conclude their comments on the topic in these words:
Wasomi hao wanahitimisha maoni yao kwenye mada hii kwa maneno haya:

“In the performance of his or her functions, a judge is no - one’s employee. He or she is a servant of, and answerable only to, the law and to his conscience which the judge is obliged to constantly examine. It is axiomatic that, apart from any system of appeal, a judge deciding a case does not act on any order or instruction of a third party inside or outside the judiciary. Any hierarchical organisation of the judiciary and any difference in grade or rank shall, in no way, interfere with the right of a judge to pronounce the judgment freely, uninfluenced by extrinsic considerations or influences.”

“Katika utekelezaji wa majukumu yake jaji si mtumishi wa mtu yeyote. Yeye ni mtwana wa sheria na anawajibika kwa sheria na dhamiri yake tu ambayo anawajibika daima kuihoji.Ni dhahiri kuwa mbali ya mfumo wowote wa rufaa,jaji anapohukumu kesi haamurishwi na amri yoyote ile au maelekezo ya mtu yeyote Yule au nje ya mahakama.Muundo wowote wa utawala wa mahakama na tofauti zozote katika daraja au cheo haviwezi kwa namna yoyote ile kuingilia haki ya jaji kutamka hukumu bila kuzongwa na taathiri ama upendeleo.”

It cannot be over-emphasized that a judge must demonstrate the same degree of boldness in defending his or her independence from his or her colleagues and superiors as he or she does in defending what I have described in this paper as external independence. Doing so should, hopefully, cause those members of the executive who harbour the belief that the independence of the judiciary is intended to glorify judicial officers or belittle the prestige of those working in the other two pillars of the State to accept the fact that the independence is assured to the judged and not for judges.

Ni vema kusisitiza kuwa jaji lazima aoneshe kiwango swa cha ujasiri katika kutetea uhuru wake kutokamkwa wenzake na wakuu wake kama ambavyo anatetea nilichokieleza katika andiko hili kama uhuru wa nje wa mahakama. Kwa kufanya hivyo natumai, kutasababisha watendaji walio na imani kuwa uhuru wa mahakama una leno la kutukuza maafisa wa mahakama au kutweza ufahari wa wale walio katika mihimili mingine ya dola kukubali ukweli kuwa uhuru wa mahakama unalenga kutetea wahukumiwa na sio majaji.

Like the other types of the independence of the judiciary, the independence from society or groups thereof is a crucial one in the administration of justice. A judge’s duty is to administer justice in accordance with the law as he or she understands it. Whether or not his or her decision will be popular is a matter which must not enter his or her mind. While courts belong to the people and while public confidence in the judiciary is essential, a judge must stand very firm against any intimidation or pressure from members of the public. A judge must defend zealously the independence from society or groups thereof. This is not, however, to say that he or she is not expected to share the hopes and fears of the ordinary citizen. Judges will do well to remember these wise words from President Jimmy Carter:
Kama ilivyo kwa aina nyingine za uhuru, uhuru toka kwa jamii au makundi yake pia ni suala nyeti katika utoaji haki.Wajibu wa jaji ni kutoa haki kulingana na sheria ambayo anaielewa. Bila kujali iwapo uamuzi wake utapendwa na watu wengi au la,hicho si kitu cha kuingia akilini mwake. Maadamu mahakama ni za watu na maadamu imani ya watu kwa mahakama ni muhimu jaji anapaswa kusimama imara dhidi ya vitisho au shinikizo kutoka kwa watu. Jaji lazima atetee kwa nguvu zote uhuru toka kwa jamii na makundi yake. Hapa si kusema kwamba jaji hapaswi kushiriki matarajio na hofu ya mwananchi wa kawaida, la hasha. Majaji watafanya vema iwapo watakumbuka maneno ya hekima ya Rais Jimmy Carter aliposema:

“The law is not a private property of lawyers, nor is justice the exclusive province of judges and juries. In the final analysis, true justice is not a matter of courts and law books, but of a commitment in each of us to liberty and mutual respect.”
“Sheria si mali binafsi ya wanasheria wala haki si miliki pekee ya majaji na wazee wa baraza. Kwa mchanganuo wa mwisho, haki ya kweli si jambo la mahakama na vitabu vya sheria tu bali ni dhamira ya kila mmoja wetu kuleta uhuru na kuheshimiana.”

The importance of the independence from society or groups thereof was very ably explained by Mr. Justice P. B. Mukhanji when he observed:
Umuhimu wa uhuru wa mahakama kutoka kwa jamii na makundi yake umeelezezwa vizuri pia na jaji P.B.MUkhanji aliposema:

“The independence of the judiciary today requires to be maintained not only against abuse of powers by other branches of Government but also and no less against the pressure of the mobs. It has to rise above the clamour of the passing day. A judiciary that can only tell the Government when it is wrong and not the people when they are wrong, is not an independent but a timid judiciary. To be numerous is not necessarily to be just or even to be right. Justice does not trim its sails to flap with every passing wind. It is the one institution that has to stand solid and four square to all winds that blow and beat upon its fears.”

“Uhuru wa mahakama leo hii unahitaji kulindwa sit u dhidi ya matumizi mabovu ya madaraka yanayofanywa na matawi mengine ya serikali bali pia na hasa dhidi ya shinikizo kutoka kwa makundi.Lazima mahakama ishinde kelele ama hoihoi za kila siku.Mahakama inayoweza tu kuiambia serikali ikikosea na sio watu wakikosea, mahakama hiyo si huru bali ni mahakama yenye woga.Kuwa wengi si lazima kutenda haki.Haki haizuii matanga yake kupepea kwa kila upepo uvumao. Ni taasisi inayotakiwa kusimama imara na kwa miraba mine kwa upepo wowote uvumao na kushinda hofu zake zote.”

It may also be helpful, I think, to call attention to the following words of Professor D. V. Cowen, in his book, The Foundations of Freedom:

Ni vizuri pia kutumia maneno ya Profesa D.V.Cowen katika kitabu chake cha “Misingi ya Uhuru”:

“The seat of power has, of course, largely changed since Bracton’s day. It is no longer so much a question of taming the arbitrary will of the kings and emperors and popes, but of restraining the people themselves and their representatives. Today it is the tyranny of a majority which constantly threatens to pervert and destroy democracy; and this is a tyranny which can be as ferocious and evil as that of any other ruler.”

“Kiti cha mamlaka bila bila shaka kimebadilika toka enzi za Braktoni. Sio tena suala la kukumbatia udhalimu wa wafalme,watawala na mapapa, bali kuzuia udhalimu wa watu wenyewe na wawakilishi wao. Leo hii ni udhalimu wa walio wengi ndio ambao daima unatishia kupotosha na kuharibu demokrasia; na ni udhalimu huu ambao waweza kuwa mbaya na mchungu kuliko ule wa mtawala yeyote.”

It can be asserted without any fear of contradiction, I think, that justice is the foundation of progressive stability in society. But, in order for the administration of justice to command the respect of the ordinary man and woman, judges must, among other things, constantly remember that they are guardians of democratic values and the people’s rights in their societies. When called upon to interpret constitutions they must adopt the approach that those instruments are living documents, open to contemporary interpretation to address modern concerns. To borrow the language of the learned authors of the book, Legal and Professional Ethics, which I have already referred to: “Every endeavour should be made to preserve independent judiciary as a citadel of public justice and public security to fulfill the constitutional role assigned to the Judges.” As far as the discharge of the duty of constitutional interpretation is concerned, I would respectfully appeal to judges in Sub-Saharan Africa to take note of the words of Bhagwati, J., in India v Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth, AIR 1977 SC 2279 at 2362:

Inaweza kusemwa pasipo hofu ya malumbano nadhani, kuwa haki ni msingi wa jamii imara na endelevu.Lakini ili haki itendeke kwa mtu wa kawaida, majaji wanapaswa pamoja na mambo mengine daima kukumbuka kuwa wao ni walezi wa takarama za demokrasi na haki za watu katika jamii. Wanapotakiwa kutafsiri katiba,wanapaswa kuasili mwenendo au uelekeo ambao utaifanya katiba kuwa chombo kinachoishi, kilicho wazi kwa tafsiri za kisasa ili kuendana na matakwa ya sasa.Tukiazima maneno ya watunzi mahiri wa kitabu cha sheria na maadili ya kieledi, ambacho tayari nimekirejea humu: “ Kila jitihada inapaswa kufanywa kulinda uhuru wa mahakama kama boma la haki za watu na usalama wao ili kutimiza jukumu la kikatiba walilopewa majaji.” Kwa jinsi kazi ya kutafsiri katiba ilivyo,kwa heshima na taadhima nitoe mwito kwa majaji wote kusini mwa jangwa la sahara kuzingatia maneno ya Mheshimiwa Jaji Bhagwati, katika kesi ya India dhidi ya Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth, AIR 1977 SC 2279 uk.2362:

“… when the court interprets a constitutional provision, it breathes life into the inert words used in the founding document. The problem before the constitution court is not a mere verbal problem … The court cannot interpret a provision of the Constitution by making “a fortress out of the dictionary.” The significance of a constitutional problem is vital, not formal: it has to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering the purpose and intendment of the framers as gathered from the context and the setting in which the words occur… [T]he process of constitutional interpretation is in the ultimate analysis one of reading values into its clauses.”

“……..wakati wa mahakama ikitafsiri kipengele cha katiba, inatia pumzi ya uhai katika maneno yaliyotumika katika katiba hiyo. Tatizo lililopo katika mahakama ya katiba sio la kunenwa kwa kinywa tu……Mahakama haiwezi kutafsiri kipengele cha katiba kwa kujenga “ngome nje ya kamusi.” Umuhimu/uzito wa tatizo la kikatiba ni unyeti wake na sio urasmi wake:Umuhimu wake lazima uchukuliwe si kwa kuchukua maneno na kamusi tu, bali kwa kuzingatia lengo na madhumuni ya watunga katiba kama yalivyokusanywa kwa muktadha na mpangilio wake ambao maneno haya yanajitokeza….Mchakato wa kutafsiri katiba hatimaye ni wa kusoma takarama katika vifungu vyake.”

A constitution of a democratic State cannot rightly be regarded as a static document. Judges have the power to discover in it new constitutional rights and expand existing ones. In many countries in Africa party or parliamentary supremacy has given way to constitutional supremacy, but serious threats to this new constitutional system are emerging on the ground. Attempts are being made to replace the system of presidency with a monarchist presidency, and the multi-party system is given little chance to function smoothly. Judges must boldly nip these evil plans in the bud. Purposive interpretation of the constitution will enable them to achieve that noble goal and to secure the people’s support for the independence of the judiciary. If the judges’ interpretation of the supreme law does not give effect to their legitimate aspirations and hopes, the people are likely to regard the judiciary and judicial independence as being of little relevance to their struggle for democracy and rule of law.

Katiba ya nchi ya kidemokrasia haiwezi kulinganishwa na kitu tuli. Majaji wanao uwezo wa kuvumbua haki mpya za kikatiba na kuzipanua zilizopo. Katika nchi nyingi za Afrika hatamu za chama au bunge zimetoa mwanya kwa hatamu za katiba, lakini tishio kubwa kwa mfumo huu mpya limeanza kujitokeza.Juhudi zinafanywa kubadilisha mfumo wa Urais kwa ule wa Urais wa Kifalme, na mfumo wa vyama vingi unapewa nafasi finyu kufanya kazi.Majaji wanapaswa kwa ujasiri kubinya hila hizi mbaya kwenye tumba.Tafsiri ya kimalengo ya katiba itawasaidia kufikia azma hiyo kuu na kupata afiki ya watu kwa uhuru wa mahakama.Iwapo tafsiri ya majaji ya katiba haijibu matarajio halali ya watu na matumaini, watu wanaweza kuiona mahakama na uhuru wake kama vitu visivyo na faida katika mapambano yao ya demokrasia na utawala wa sheria.

Although in the discharge of their duties judges have no employer and, therefore, are answerable to no one except to their consciences and the law (Justice Learned Hand is on record of having told his clerk that he (Justice) was responsible to the books in his library), it is of paramount importance that their conduct in and out of court reaffirms the people’s faith in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. It is not enough for a judge to be independent; he or she must do everything possible within his or her power to ensure that he or she is so perceived by society. Sometimes people of low moral character or who are lazy join politics. Sadly, it is equally true that sometimes people of that type succeed to join the judiciary as judges. It is the role of judges to take appropriate steps geared at enabling the relevant authorities to weed out such judicial officers from the judiciary. At their regular conferences or meetings judges should openly and loudly exchange views as to how vices within the judiciary should be eliminated and press for the elimination. Incompetence, corruption, timidity, arbitrariness and laziness are serious threats to the independence of the judiciary. Some judges take unconscionable time to prepare their reserved judgments. It is beyond rational controversy that the tyranny of reserved judgments oppresses the interested parties and society at large. Those who are guilty of that tyranny should attempt to answer Hamlet’s question in William Shakespeare’s ‘Hamlet’ lll:

Ingawaje katika kutekeleza kazi za za kila siku majaji si watumishi wa mtu yeyote, na hivyo hawawajibiki kwa mtu yeyote isipokuwa kwa dhamiri zao na sheria(Mheshimiwa Jaji Hand alikaririwa akimwambia karani wake kuwa yeye(jaji) anawajibika kwa vitabu vilivyoko maktabani kwake), basi ni jambo la muhimu sana kwamba matendo yao ya ndani na ya nje ya mahakama yakathibitisha imani ya watu katika uhuru na kutofungamana kwa mahakama. Haitoshi tu kwa jaji kuwa huru; anapaswa kufanya kila awezalo ndani ya uwezo wake kuhakikisha kuwa jamii inamhisi hivyo.Wakati mwingine watu wenye maadili hafifu au wazembe wanajiunga na siasa. Ni jambo la kusikitisha pia kuwa wakati mwingine watu wa aina hiyo wanafanikiwa kujiunga na mahakama kama majaji. Ni jukumu la majaji kuchukua kila hatua kuhakikisha kuwa mamalaka husika zinawaondoa watu hawa kutoka mahakamani. Katika mikutano yao ya kila mara majaji lazima waseme wazi na kubadilishana mawazo ni kwa jinsi gani tabia mbaya ndani ya mahakama zitaweza kuondoshwa na kushinikiza kuondolewa. Uwezo hafifu, rushwa, hofu, udhalimu na uzembe ni vitu hatari sana kwa uhuru wa mahakama. Majaji wengine huchukua muda usiojulikana kuandaa hukumu zao limbikizwa.Hakuna shaka kwamba ubabe wa hukumu zilizolimbikizwa unakandamiza wahusika katika kesi na jamii kwa ujumla. Wale waliohatiani kwa ubabe huo wajaribu kujibu swali la Hamleti katika kitabu cha William Shekispia (’Hamlet’ III)

For who would bear the whips and
scorns of time,
The oppressor’s wrong, the proud
man’s contumely,
The pangs of despis’d love, the law’s
delay,
The insolence of office, and the
spurns
That patient merit of the unworthy
takes,
When he himself might his quietus
make
With a bare bodkin?

Wale wanaobeba mijeledi na mabezo ya muda,
Makosa ya mkandamizaji,fahari ya ukatili wa mtu,
Majuto ya pendo la waliodharauliwa, ucheleweshaji wa sheria,
ufedhuli wa ofisi na kukataliwa ambako kuna beba sifa za wasiostahili kupata,ambapo yeye mwenyewe anaweza kwa ukimya wake kuchukua pasi kuwa na tungo au shazia?

As was observed by Lord Mackay of Clashfern in his address to the 7th International Appellate Judges Conference and 6th Commonwealth Chief Justices Conference in Ottawa, Canada, in 1995, the principle of judicial independence, as with any other principle, should not be stretched to lengths that makes it untenable. Judicial independence does not condone incompetence or laziness.

Kama ilivyopata kuelezwa na Bwana Mackay wa Clashfern katika hotuba yake kwenye mkutano wa saba wa kimataifa wa majaji wa mahakama za rufani na mkutano wa sita wa mkutano wa majaji wakuu wan chi za jumuiya ya madola huko Ottawa, Canada mwaka 1995,kanuni ya uhuru wa mahakama, kama zilivyo kanuni nyingine haipaswi kupanuliwa katika urefu usiowezekana. Uhuru wa mahkama hauafiki uzembe na utendaji hafifu.

Judges have an important role of enhancing public awareness of judicial independence. Public confidence and esteem for courts cannot be established and maintained through the people’s ignorance over how the judiciary operates. Members of the public should be given the opportunity to reasonably understand the judiciary and judicial independence. The learned authors of the Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct allude to the importance of the public awareness in a language which I cannot improve upon. This is what they state at p. 52:

Majaji wana jukumu muhimu la kukuza uelewa wa watu juu ya uhuru wa mahakama. Imani ya wananchi na kujivunia mahakama haviwezi kujengwa na kudumishwa kama watu hawajui namna gani mahakama inafanya kazi zake.Watu wanapaswa kupewa nafasi ya kuielewa kifasaha mahakama na uhuru wake. Wasomi waandishi wa masimulizi ya kanuni za mwenendo wa mahakama za Bangalore wametaja umuhimu wa uelewa wa wananchi katika lugha ambayo siwezi kuiboresha.Hivi ndivyo wanavyosema katika Uk.52

“A judge should recognize that not everyone is familiar with [the concepts of institutional and operational independence of the judiciary] and their impact on judicial responsibilities. Public education with respect to the judiciary and judicial independence thus becomes an important function, both of the government and its institutions and of the judiciary itself, for misunderstanding can undermine public confidence in the judiciary. The public may not get a completely balanced view of the principle of judicial independence from the media which may portray it incorrectly as protecting judges from review of and public debate concerning their actions. A judge should, therefore, in view of the public’s own interest, take advantage of appropriate opportunities to help the public understand the fundamental importance of judicial independence.”

“Jaji ni lazima atambue kuwa si kila mtu anafahamu [dhana ya taasisi na utendaji wa uhuru wa mahakama] na athari zake katika uwajibikaji wa kimahakama.Elimu kwa umma kuhusu mahakama na uhuru wake ni kazi muhimu kwa serikali na taasisi zake na ya mahakama yenyewe, kwakuwa mifarakano inaweza kudororesha imani ya watu katika mahakama. Umma hauwezi kupata mtazamo wiani wa kanuni za uhuru wa mahakama kutoka kwenye vyombo vya habari ambavyo vinaweza kuuelezea ndivyo sivyo(kimakosa) kama vile unawalinda majaji dhidi ya marejeo na mijadala ya umma kuhusu matendo yao. Kwa hiyo Jaji anapaswa kwa mtazamo wa maslahi ya jamii yake, kuchukua faida ya fursa nzuri aliyonayo kuisaidia jamii/umma kuelewa umuhimu mkuu wa uhuru wa mahakama.”
This public education would also enable members of the public to acquire a correct understanding of the difficult nature of judges’ functions and, therefore, be placed in a better position to render assistance in exerting pressure on relevant State authorities to take necessary measures aimed at ensuring that judges’ remuneration corresponds with the dignity of their office and scope of their duties to society. A judge, it has been said, “must be a jurist endowed with the legislator’s wisdom, historian’s search for truth, prophet’s vision, capacity to respond to the needs of the present, resilience to cope with the demands of the future and to decide objectively disengaging himself/herself from every personal influence or predilections.” For the benefit of the advisers of those wielding executive powers who may happen to read this paper, I wish to reproduce, at this juncture, the following observations on the difficult nature of a judge’s life said to have been made by Mr. Justice K. K. Barneji, retired Judge of the Patna High Court in India, in his article on “Life of a judge” (see the book on ethics, quoted from hereinbefore, at p. 402):
Elimu hii kwa umma itawawezesha pia wananchi kupata ufahamu sahihi wa asili ya ugumu wa kazi ya jaji na hivyo kuwa katika nafasi nzuri ya kusaidia kutoa msukumo kwa mamlaka husika za nchi kuchukua hatua zipasazo zenye lengo la kuhakikisha maslahi ya majaji yanawiana na hadhi ya ofisi zao na mwelekeo wa shughuli zao kwa jamii.Imepata kusemwa kuwa, jaji “lazima awe msomi wa sheria mahiri aliyejawa na hekima za bunge,historia ya kutafuta ukweli, upeo wa kinabii, uwezo wa kuitikia matakwa ya wakati huu, uwezo wa kuendana na mahitaji ya baadaye na kuamua vema huku akijitahidi kujitoa kutoka kwenye kila aina ya taathira binafsi na upendeleo.” Kwa faida ya washauri wa wanaoshikilia madaraka ya kiutendaji ambao wanaweza kusoma makala/andiko hili, napenda kutoa maoni yafuatayo juu ya ugumu wa maisha ya jaji ambayo yamepata kusemwa pia na Jaji K.K.Barneji, Jaji mstaafu wa mahakama kuu ya India, katika makala yake ya “Maisha ya Jaji” (Angalia kitabu cha maadili, ambacho nimekirejea humu kabla, katika uk.402):

“A judge sleeps on no bed of roses. Sometimes it may be all roses but no bed when a Session Judge has to pass a sentence of death and when two High Court Judges have to confirm it. They may ask about your family’s welfare, discuss the prospect of the test- matches and join in the outbursts on the Chinese aggression, the Kashmir issue, but all the time whirling in their brain a ceaseless effort for a satisfactory answer to the vital question whether the accused was really guilty. There is perpetual worry while on the chair or on the floor, in the bath or in the drawing-room and even in parties where the exquisite midriff of the slender and delicate fair sex fails to bring out any relief except, probably, a subdued sigh.
This endless worry saps the life of a Judge, hour by hour, stretching out to months and no wonder that at the journey’s end, and many a time long before that, he is a physical weak, a victim to diabetes and blood-pressure hardly capable of enjoying the pension for a reasonable number of years.”
“Jaji analala katika kitanda kisicho na mauwaridi. Wakati mwingine kwakweza kuwa na mauwaridi lakini hakuna kitanda wakati ambapo jaji anatakiwa kupitisha hukumu ya kifo na wakati majaji wawili wa mahakama kuu wanatakiwa kuithibitisha. Wanaweza kuuliza habari kuhusu familia yako,wakajadili matarajio ya mechi za majaribio na kujiunga katika kukemea ukandamizaji wa China, suala la Kashmiri,lakini wakati wote huo wakiweweseka ubongoni mwao na juhudi zisizoisha kupata jibu la kuridhisha kwenye swali muhimu iwapo mtuhumiwa alikuwa kweli ana hatia.Kuna hofu isiyoisha wakati jaji akiwa katika kiti chake au ameketi chini sakafuni, bafuni au hata katika chumba cha kuandikia na hata kwa watu ambao matumbo yao laini na ya kupendeza pamoja na mapenzi mwororo yanashindwa kumpa nafuu yoyote isipokuwa, penginepo mkoromo unaotisha.
Hofu hii isiyoisha hutawala maisha ya jaji, saaa hadi saa,ikiendelea mbele miezi na miezi na si ajabu mwisho wa safari yake, na mara nyingi kabla ya hapo, tayari ameshakuwa dhaifu na mhanga/muathirika wa kisukari na shinikizo la damu vinavyomfanya asifaidi pensheni kwa miaka kadhaa.“

The importance of personal independence in the administration of justice cannot be over-emphasized. As an eminent Indian jurist observed, justice should be cheap, but judges should be dear.
Umuhimu wa uhuru binafsi katika utoaji haki hauwezi kusisitizwa zaidi. Kama mwanasheria mahiri wa kihindi alivyopata kusema, “haki lazima iwe rahisi lakini majaji lazima wawe aghali”

I have clearly demonstrated, I hope, that judges have a key role to play in promoting the independence of the judiciary. Their accountability should enable them to play that role effectively. They must not fail in the discharge of that very important duty.
Nimeeleza kinaganaga, natumaini, kwamba majaji wana jukumu kubwa la kufanya katika kukuza uhuru wa mahakama. Uwajibikaji wao uwawezeshe kufanya kazi hiyo kwa ufanisi.Hawapaswi kushindwa kutekeleza wajibu huo muhimu.

©Haki Miliki Na Haki Shiriki ya Tafsiri-Augustus Fungo, 2008.
Anapatikana kwenye wavuti wake wa http://www.thejuristicnews.com/ au barua pepe augustoons@yahoo.co.uk